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Much of the academic debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid is centered on the 
relationship between aid and growth.  Different aid-growth studies find conflicting 
results: aid promotes growth everywhere; aid has a zero or negative impact on growth 
everywhere; or the effect of aid on growth depends on recipient-specific characteristics, 
such as the quality of institutions and policies.  Although these studies fuel an interesting 
debate, cross-sectional macroeconomic studies cannot be the last word on the topic of aid 
effectiveness.  In this paper, Dollar and Levin introduce microeconomic evidence on 
factors conducive to the success of aid-funded projects in developing countries.  The 
authors use the success rate of World Bank-financed projects in the 1990s, as determined 
by the Operations Evaluation Department, as their dependent variable.  Using 
instrumental variables estimation, the authors find that existence of high-quality 
institutions in a recipient country raises the probability that aid will be used effectively.  
There is also some evidence that geography matters, but location in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is a more robust indicator of  lower project success rate than tropical climate.  The 
authors proceed to disaggregate the success rate of World Bank projects by lending 
instrument type and by investment sector, finding that different institutions are more 
important for different types of projects.  The finding of a strong relationship between 
institutional quality and project success serves to provide further support to the 
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Sowing and Reaping: 
Institutional Quality and Project Outcomes in Developing Countries 
 
1. Introduction 
  In recent years, the international donor community as well as academic 
researchers have turned their attention to the effectiveness of development assistance.  
Although studies considering the impact of aid in developing countries were conducted as 
early as the 1940s and 1950s, a critical mass of literature on aid effectiveness has 
emerged only in the past decade or so.   
  Presently, one aspect of aid-related economic literature, the relationship between 
foreign assistance and economic growth in recipient countries, is the topic of intense 
debate among academics.  Representing the whole spectrum of model specifications and 
estimation methods, the studies conducted so far support one of three quite different 
conclusions about the effect of aid on growth.
1  First, there are studies that find an 
unambiguously positive effect of aid on growth, regardless of any recipient characteristic 
(Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott 2003; Lensink and 
Morrissey 1999; Clemens et al. 2004).  A contrasting conclusion is reached by Mosley et 
al. (1987), Boone (1994), and Easterly et al. (2003), who argue that aid, on average, has a 
zero or negative effect on the economic growth of its recipients, again irrespective of any 
recipient-specific trait.  Finally, still other research on the same topic yields more 
conditional results, with the sign and size of the effect of aid on growth depending on 
certain features or characteristics of recipient countries, such as the quality of their 
institutions and policies or vulnerability to shocks.  This third approach is supported by 
                                                 
1 For extended reviews of aid-growth literature, see Clemens et al. (2004), Mosley (1980), and Hansen and 
Tarp (2000).   2
the analysis in World Bank (1998), Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), Collier and Dollar 
(2002), Collier and Dehn (2001), and Guillamont and Chauvet (2001).   
  The academic discussion above is truly vigorous and useful, but while producing 
interesting results and raising fascinating questions, cross-sectional macroeconomic 
studies cannot be the last word on the topic of aid effectiveness.  Small changes in 
specification and country coverage lead to qualitative changes in results in all of these 
studies, reflecting the fact that there is not enough variation across countries and too 
much collinearity among determinants of growth.  This paper attempts to go beyond the 
existing rhetoric and introduce microeconomic evidence on factors conducive to project 
success in developing countries.  If aid works the same everywhere, then one would 
expect to find clear evidence of this in the data on the outcomes of projects funded by 
development assistance.  The finding of a strong relationship between institutional quality 
and project outcomes, on the other hand, would serve to provide further support to the 
validity of the third hypothesis of aid effectiveness, with the effect of aid conditional on 
institutions and policies of the recipient country. 
  In focusing on project-level evidence, we follow studies performed by World 
Bank researchers, such as Isham and Kaufmann (1999), Isham et al. (1997), and 
Kaufmann and Wang (1995).  Instead of growth, these three studies use project-level 
indicators – economic rate of return and project success / failure, provided by World 
Bank’s Operations and Evaluations department (OED) – as the dependent variable.  
Putting different recipient country-specific institutional and policy indicators on the right-
hand side of their models, the three studies find that the ERRs are higher and probability 
of project failure lower in countries with better policies and institutions.  In the present 
paper, we extend this analysis and introduce other possible explanations of the rate of 
project success across countries.    3
  Another strand of recent macroeconomic literature has concentrated on the deep 
determinants of well-being and growth in developing countries.  The two most frequently 
invoked of these underlying influential factors are geographical characteristics and 
institutional features.  Jared Diamond (1997) and Jeffrey Sachs (Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger 1999; Sachs 2001) are the most vocal proponents of the theory that climate, 
access to coastline, disease burden, and other geographical aspects determine the 
developmental path of different countries.  On the other hand, Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
Rodrik et al. (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Engermann and Sokoloff (1997), as well as 
Knack and Keefer (1995) emphasize the vital importance of stable and effective 
institutions and policies, or the “social infrastructure” (Hall and Jones 1999), in laying the 
foundation for successful development.  Rodrik et al. (2002) have compared the 
performance of the two theories (as well as the third one, concerning trade) in the same 
regression model, concluding that “institutions rule.”  In the present paper, we also take a 
first step in comparing the power of geographical and institutional factors to determine 
project outcomes in developing countries. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we introduce the 
overall success rate of World Bank-financed projects as determined by OED as a measure 
of aid effectiveness.  This success rate varies substantially across countries.  We try to 
explain success rate by measures of institutional quality (a property rights/rule of law 
measure and Freedom House democracy measure).  It turns out that both institutional 
quality measures are highly correlated with project success rate, property rights/rule of 
law especially so.  Using instrumental variables estimation we provide evidence that this 
is a causal relationship, with high-quality institutions raising the probability that aid will 
be used effectively.  There is also some evidence that geography matters: but an indicator 
variable for Sub-Saharan Africa is more robust than an indicator for whether the country   4
is located in the tropics.  We also find some modest evidence of diminishing returns to 
aid: in countries receiving large volumes of aid it is harder to have successful projects. 
  The third section of the paper disaggregates project success rate in different ways.  
First, policy-based adjustment loans are separated from investment loans.  An interesting 
result here is that democratic political institutions facilitate successful policy-based loans, 
whereas property rights/rule of law is more important for investment loans.  Given the 
well-established relationship between property rights and growth, this latter finding 
makes sense: it is difficult to have a high-return public investment if the institutional 
framework is not conducive to economic growth.  This may appear self-evident with 
“hard” investments such as transport infrastructure.  But it is interesting that there is a 
similarly strong relationship between property rights and “soft” investments in education 
and health.  It is difficult to have successful projects addressing these important social 
needs in a weak institutional environment. 
  The fourth section concludes by making a link between these project-level results 
and the larger macroeconomic literature on aid effectiveness.  
 
2.  Overall Project Success Rate and Institutional Quality 
We argued in the previous section that cross-country growth regressions alone are 
unlikely to settle the debate about aid effectiveness and institutional quality because 
different data-sets, specifications, and methodologies yield different results.  We take the 
view that the cross-country correlations are informative, but need to be complemented by 
other kinds of information.  Here we are going to draw on the extensive database of 
World Bank-financed projects carried out in nearly 100 different developing countries 
during the 1990s and examine the factors that influence the success or failure of aid-
financed projects.    5
The World Bank has an independent Operations Evaluation Department (OED) 
that reports directly to the shareholders (not the management) and that makes an ex post 
assessment of each project financed by the Bank.  OED makes a number of different 
evaluations; we use its most fundamental “thumbs up, thumbs down” measure of whether 
a project was satisfactory in meeting its stated objective.  We take as our universe all of 
the countries in which the Bank carried out at least three projects in the 1990s (taking the 
view that if there were only one or two projects in a country then we do not have a very 
reliable estimate of the expected success rate of donor-financed projects).  For each 
country, we thus calculate the proportion of World Bank projects, conducted between 
1990 and 1999, that were determined to have been successful by the OED.  In practice, 
this success rate varies considerably: in the largest borrowing country, China, 90% of 
projects succeeded; contrast this with Pakistan’s 67% success rate or Nigeria’s 47%.   
We consider a number of hypotheses about why this success rate varies across 
countries.  First, in line with the discussion in the introduction, we consider that the 
overall quality of the recipient country’s institutions and policies may affect the 
likelihood of project success.  We use several different measures of institutions/policies.  
From ICRG we take the Rule of Law Index. This variable "reflects the degree to which 
the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and 
implement laws and adjudicate disputes" (Knack and Keefer 1995). Higher scores 
indicate: "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power." Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical force 
or illegal means to settle claims." We take this as a key economic institution that 
indicates whether agents are secure in making transactions.  It has been found in other 
work to be an important determinant of growth and to be correlated with economic 
policies such as macroeconomic stability and openness to trade.     6
  We also consider a widely used measure of political institutions.  Since 1972, 
Freedom House has published an annual assessment of the state of freedom in all 
countries (and select territories), now known as “Freedom in the World.” Individual 
countries are evaluated based on a checklist of questions on political rights and civil 
liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties 
based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7, the 
lowest level of freedom. The combined average of each country’s political rights and 
civil liberties ratings determines an overall political freedom measure on a scale of 1-3, 
with 1 designating “free,” 2 “partly free,” and 3 “not free.”  
While it is useful to try to distinguish the influence of different types of 
institutions, there is also a tradeoff in that country coverage for each measure is not 
complete.  Therefore, as a robustness check, we also use a single overall index of 
institutional quality from Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  This measure 
averages different institutional quality indexes and has very wide country coverage. 
Aside from institutional quality, we also include on the right-hand side the log of 
per capita GDP in 1990 (from Heston et al. 2002) because very poor countries may have 
limited supporting resources to make development projects succeed.  Third, we consider 
the effect of the overall level of aid relative to GDP on project success rate (aid flows 
taken from OECD DAC 2003).  The influence of total aid could go either way: there 
could be “increasing returns” in the sense that a lot of aid may create a better 
environment of supporting services and resources (e.g., an education project may be more 
likely to meet its objectives if there are also projects in transport, rural development, etc.).  
On the other hand, one could as easily imagine diminishing returns or absorptive capacity 
constraints, so that it is hard to have a successful project if the government’s limited   7
capacity is spread over a large number of similar enterprises.  Finally, one of the key 
competing hypotheses is that in countries with geographical constraints to development it 
is more difficult to have successful projects (implied in Dalgaard et al. 2004).  We 
consider two approaches to including geography: a variable capturing the share of a 
country’s territory in the tropics (Gallup et al. 1999) and/or regional dummies for each of 
the major regions of the world.   
We start with OLS regressions and with a simple specification in which the 
project success rate for each country in the 1990s is a function of log per capita GDP, the 
Rule of Law measure, the Freedom House Index, and the overall quantity of aid relative 
to GDP (all averaged for the 1990s).   
Average project success rate in 1990si = b0 + b1 Log (per capita GDP in 1990i) + 
b2 Log (average ICRG rule of law in 1990si) + b3 Log (average Freedom House 
index in 1990si) + b4 Log (average aid to GDP in 1990si), 
 
where i is the country in which the WB projects take place. 
There is a very strong positive relationship between institutional quality and 
project success (Table 1, column 1).  Interestingly, both political freedom (5 percent 
level) and the property rights/rule of law measure (1 percent level) enter with high 
statistical significance, and the joint test on the two is even more significant.  Initial 
income level and aid enter negatively, but neither is statistically significant. 
In column 2 we introduce geography in the form of the percent of the country’s 
territory situated in the tropics.  The coefficients on the two institutional variable barely 
change and remain significant at 5 percent level.  Tropical location is associated with 
failure with a coefficient of –9.6, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.   
We can use partial scatters to illustrate this relationship between project success, 
on the one hand, and quality of institutions or tropical location on the other.  Figure 1 
shows the partial scatter of success rate on Rule of Law, corresponding to the   8
specification in column 2: it very clear visually that countries that have unexpectedly 
good institutions for their level of income, have unexpectedly high success rates of 
projects. East Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are all 
measured to have strong rule of law for their level of income, and all are countries in 
which World Bank projects have high success rates.  At the other end of the rule of law 
spectrum, countries such as Pakistan, Haiti, Jamaica, Algeria, and DR Congo all have 
high failure rates. 
Figure 2 shows the corresponding scatter plot for the tropical location variable: 
there is some relationship, but noticeably less strong than for institutions.  One can see 
visually why tropical location is not a good predictor of success/failure: Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam are all tropical countries.  African countries such as Ghana, 
Ethiopia, and Burkina Faso have pretty good success rates as well.   
While being in the tropics is not necessarily detrimental to project success, the 
visual inspection also suggests that there may be regional effects, and that omitting these 
could lead to an overestimation of the importance of institutions.  In column 3 of Table 1 
we add regional dummies to the specification (with the excluded region East Asia and 
Pacific).  The regional indicator variable for Sub-Saharan Africa in particular is highly 
significant; other things equal, success rate is about 25 percentage points lower in this 
region than in East Asia.  Note that the coefficient on rule of law barely changes and 
remains highly significant.  The coefficient on freedom, on the other hand, declines in 
magnitude and becomes insignificant.  In column 4 we drop the tropical variables and all 
of the regional dummies except Sub-Saharan Africa to provide a more parsimonious 
specification.  The most robust result in these OLS regressions is that rule of law has a 
strong positive relationship to project success, and that geography does matter in that 
Sub-Saharan African countries have lower success rates, ceteris paribus.   9
There are a number of reasons to be concerned about the OLS estimates.  
Concerning institutions, there is the possibility of reverse causation (successful projects 
build strong institutions), although, frankly, this seems unlikely to us.  More relevant, 
perhaps, is the so-called “halo effect”: there is inevitably some subjective element in the 
OED ratings as well as in the institutional quality ratings, and it is possible that visibly 
successful countries are perceived to have both good institutions and successful projects, 
creating spurious correlation.  For the aid/GDP variable, we did not get very strong 
results in the OLS regressions, but this may be because of an endogeneity problem: 
countries receiving unexpected negative shocks may both get higher volumes of aid and 
have unexpectedly poor project results, again creating spurious negative correlation.  For 
all of the above potential problems, instrumental variables approach can help produce 
more reliable estimates.  So, in the second panel of Table 1 we repeat all of the initial 
specifications, but now instrument for institutional quality as well as for aid/GDP, using 
instruments that have been used in other studies exploring the effect of institutions and 
aid (share of the population speaking English, share speaking a continental European 
language, distance from the equator, level of population, and each of the above multiplied 
by population, thus adding up to eight instruments). 
In the IV regressions tropical location is not important, and even the regional 
dummies are insignificant.  In Column 4 the coefficient on the indicator for Sub-Saharan 
Africa is –12.5, but not statistically significant.  In this specification both the Freedom 
and Law variables are statistically significant and the coefficients are larger than in the 
OLS regressions.  The standard deviation of the rule of law variable in this sample is 
about 1.0 and the standard deviation of freedom is about 0.6.  So, one standard deviation 
higher on rule of law corresponds to 16 percentage points higher success rate, and one 
standard deviation in the direction of more freedom (a lower number on the index)   10
corresponds to 14 percentage points higher success rate.  The coefficient on initial per 
capita GDP is negative and significant now, so that it is harder to support successful 
projects in low-income countries.  The coefficient on aid/GDP is negative, and significant 
in two specifications, so that there is some evidence, albeit weak, of diminishing returns 
or absorptive capacity constraints. Note also that the test of over-identifying restrictions 
passes very well in all of the specifications. 
  These initial results are quite encouraging.  But we noted that there are nearly 100 
countries in which the World Bank has project experience in the 1990s, and yet data 
availability constrains the sample in Table 1 to 75 countries.  So, as a robustness check, 
we repeat all of these specifications in Table 2, but replace the separate rule of law and 
freedom indexes with a single overall institutional quality measure (the KKZ index in 
1996).  While this measure is less precise, it has the advantage of being available for 
nearly every country, and increases our sample to 90 countries.  The main point from 
Table 2 is that this single institutional quality indicator is always highly significant so we 
can be confident that the results in Table 1 are not coming from a biased sample.  A 
standard deviation better on the KKZ index corresponds to 24 percentage points higher 
project success rate (based on the last specification of Table 2 (column 8)).  
Thus, a review of project success rates supports the hypothesis that the recipient 
country’s own institutions and policies are the key determinant of aid effectiveness.  
Beyond that, there is some evidence of diminishing returns to aid and of a role for 
geography; notably, it is harder to fund successful projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
3.  Success Rates and Institutional Quality at the Sector Level 
One potential weakness of the approach taken in the previous section is that we 
are combining success rates for very different kinds of projects: some are policy-oriented   11
adjustment loans, while others are investment projects.  The investment projects in turn 
cover widely different sectors, from transport investments to rural development to 
education and health.  In this section we explore how robust our results are to 
disaggregation to the sector level.  Disaggregation comes at a cost: in the case of health 
sector investments, for example, there are only 52 countries that had this type of project, 
so that the number of observations declines.  Given that we found little evidence that  
endogeneity problems were biasing the qualitative conclusions, here we restrict ourselves 
to OLS regressions. 
First we differentiate the loans between adjustment operations and investment 
projects (Table 3).  Law and democracy are both important for the success of adjustment 
operations, but it is striking that the coefficient on democracy here is larger than in any 
other specification.  In the case of investment loans, on the other hand, the coefficient on 
democracy is not significantly different from zero (panel 2).  Law  is significant at the 1% 
level for investment projects in two of the four specifications (it is significant at 5% level 
in the other two).  Thus, having a good institutional environment for growth appears to be 
important for effective investment projects funded by aid.  It remains the case that an 
indicator variable for Sub-Saharan Africa has more explanatory power than a measure of 
tropical location: for both adjustment loans and investment loans, project success is 26% 
less likely in Africa than in other continents, other things equal.  Note that in seven out of 
eight specifications per capita GDP is not significant: when low-income countries 
succeed in creating reasonably good institutions, it is possible for the international 
community to provide assistance with a high degree of confidence that the results will be 
positive. 
We turn next to a sector-by-sector review.  For education projects, property 
rights/rule of law is the only robust determinant of project success, significant at the 1%   12
level.  Economic policy loans consist mainly of adjustment loans, so the results are 
similar to those earlier findings: democratic institutions are particularly important for 
success of economic reform support.  The results for projects in the health, nutrition, and 
population sector are similar to those for education: property rights/rule of law is the only 
robust determinant of success (the smaller number of observations in this sector affected 
the significance levels in two, less parsimonious, specifications).  There is a similar 
finding for rural projects and for transport investments, though the law variable just 
misses being significant at 10% level in the latter case. 
As before, we can get quite a few more observations if we use a single measure of 
institutional quality rather than both the law and democracy indicators.  Table 4 provides 
a variety of specifications using the overall institutional quality measure (KKZ).  The key 
point here is that the institutions measure is significant at the 1% level in every sector, 
except for rural, in which it is significant at the 5% level. In quite a few of the 
specifications the indicator variable for Sub-Saharan Africa is not large and not 
statistically significant, nor is the tropical location indicator. 
4. Conclusions 
We would like to conclude by relating these results to the larger debate about aid 
effectiveness and to the growth-regressions literature.  We have documented a stylized 
fact that is well known to anyone who has practical experience in the aid business: the 
success of aid-sponsored projects depends primarily on the quality of the institutions in 
the recipient country.  Virtually all donor projects work in China, regardless of sector.  In 
some Sub-Saharan African countries with weak institutions, on the other hand, a majority 
of efforts fail.   
How do we relate this then to the macro literature? As we noted in the 
introduction, some researchers have found specifications in which aid appears to have the   13
same positive effect on growth in all countries, regardless of their institutions and 
location.  On the face of it, this is an extremely hard result to accept as a robust finding.  
Since most of the individual investments supported by aid fail in the countries with weak 
institutions – and we know little or no overall growth is recorded – it is hard to believe 
that aid has had a positive effect there.  
On the other hand, we have to point out that the micro evidence alone cannot be 
decisive on this question, for the reason that money in general is fungible.  When donors 
fund a project in China, for example, in general the donors are presented with high-
priority projects that the government is likely to do anyway.  The result of the donor 
support is that the project is done differently than it would have been without donor 
involvement and the government has resources freed up to pursue other, less high-priority 
activities (or to reduce taxes below where they would be otherwise).  Thus, it is possible 
that every single donor-financed project is deemed to be successful, but yet there may be 
no overall net positive effect if the marginal projects funded by the government are all 
very bad.   
It is for this reason that we find the combination of the micro evidence and the 
macro evidence most compelling.  Our results make it very unlikely that aid works the 
same everywhere.  And the fact that in several different macro data-sets researchers have 
found that growth is correlated with the interaction of aid and a measure of institutional 
quality or economic policies increases our confidence that aid is playing a useful role 
when it is targeted to low-income countries with reasonably sound institutions and 
policies.  In terms of aid policy, our work provides additional support to the view that aid 
resources have the greatest impact on development when they are channeled to poor 
countries with sound institutions.  
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Table 1.  Project Success Rate, Institutions (rule of law and freedom), and Geography  
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ECA     -7.971 
(0.88) 
    -3.088 
(0.22) 
 
LAC     -3.980 
(0.36) 
    7.108 
(0.28) 
 
MENA     -14.643 
(1.70)* 
    4.865 
(0.26) 
 
SAR     -8.461 
(0.73) 



















Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared  0.29 0.31 0.40 0.38         
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
        2.70 2.81 2.86 2.97 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
        0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 
 
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   18
Figure 1.  Partial Scatter Plot of Project Success and ICRG Rule of Law (from regression 
in Table 1, column 2). 
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Figure 2.  Partial Scatter Plot of Project Success and % Tropical Territory (from 
regression in Table 1, column 2). 
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Table 2.  Project Success Rate, Institutions (KKZ), and Geography 
 
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

































































ECA     4.241 
(0.47) 
    9.336 
(0.83) 
 
LAC     -8.200 
(1.13) 
    -6.354 
(0.94) 
 
MENA     -9.393 
(1.35) 
    -4.649 
(0.41) 
 
SAR     -13.134 
(1.76)* 



















Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared  0.40 0.42 0.53 0.49         
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
     6.86  9.11  11.29  8.51 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
        0.33 0.17 0.08 0.20 
 
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
       21
Table 3. Project Success Rate Disaggregated, Institutions (rule of law and freedom), and 
Geography 
 
  Adjustment Loans  Investment Loans 




















































































ECA     -11.834 
(0.70) 
     -5.844 
(0.53) 
 
LAC     8.404 
(0.60) 
     -6.086 
(0.57) 
 
MENA     10.910 
(0.82) 
     -20.736 
(2.01)** 
 
SAR     6.139 
(0.34) 



















Observations  70 70  70  70 74  74  74 74 
R-squared  0.20 0.20  0.33  0.28 0.26  0.29  0.41 0.37 
  
 
   
 Education  Economic  Policy 




















































































ECA     -8.485 
(0.38) 
    -19.723 
(1.24) 
 
LAC     -10.699 
(0.91) 
    2.103 
(0.13) 
 
MENA     -20.682 
(1.04) 
    5.741 
(0.45) 
 
SAR     28.623 
(2.40)** 



















Observations  55 55 55 55 64 64  64  64 
R-squared  0.29 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.22  0.36  0.33   22
Table 3 (continued). Project Success Rate Disaggregated, Institutions (rule of law and 
freedom), and Geography 
 
  Health, Nutrition, and Population  Rural Sector 
  (17) (18)  (19) (20) (21)  (22) (23)  (24) 









































































AFR     7.853  12.542      -25.847  -21.982 
      (0.40)  (0.83)    (1.30)  (1.55) 
ECA     -2.855 
(0.18) 
     4.365 
(0.21) 
 
LAC     -16.128 
(0.81) 
     -12.395 
(0.54) 
 
MENA     -23.659 
(1.14) 
     -18.262 
(1.02) 
 
SAR     -14.301 
(0.47) 



















Observations  45 45  45 45 65  65 65  65 
R-squared  0.20 0.23  0.28 0.21 0.11  0.20 0.25  0.15 
 
 Transport 
  (25) (26) (27) (28) 









































ECA     -23.677 
(1.46) 
 
LAC     -33.376 
(1.73)* 
 
MENA     -12.612 
(0.77) 
 











Observations  56 56 56 56 
R-squared  0.10 0.14 0.21 0.11 
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table 4.  Project Success Rate Disaggregated, Institutions (KKZ), and Geography 
 
   Adjustment Loans  Investment Loans 


























































































   5.123 
(0.44) 
 



















































Observations  79 79 79 79 89 89 89 89 
R-squared  0.42 0.42 0.51 0.49 0.33 0.36 0.47 0.41 
 
 
   Education Economic  Policy 


























































































   1.827 
(0.14) 
 

















































Observations  67 67 67 67 72 72 72 72 
R-squared  0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.43 0.43 0.54 0.54 
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Table 4 (continued).  Project Success Rate Disaggregated, Institutions (KKZ), and 
Geography 
 
   Health, Nutrition, and Population  Rural Sector 
















































































































































Observations 52 52 52 52  78  78 78 78 
R-squared  0.23 0.25 0.28 0.24  0.14  0.19 0.26 0.16 
 
 
   Transport 










































































Observations  69 69 69 69 
R-squared 0.17  0.19  0.25  0.17 
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 